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Abstract
This article presents a model of political insulation of bureaucra-
cies. Political inuence can harm competence because it lowers the
incentives of bureaucrats to invest in competence. Politicians then
want to adopt institutions that insulate the bureaucracy because this
establishes a commitment to reward competence. Political leaders in-
sulate the bureaucracy if public good provision is important compared
to rent extraction or when political competition forces the political
elite to internalize the welfare loss caused by patronage. Through this
channel political reforms can lead to reforms of the bureaucracy. The
theoretical ndings are illustrated with existing empirical studies and
data on central bank independence.
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1 Introduction
The question of what determines e¤ective government is central to devel-
opment economics and political economy. Some progress has been made in
the study of certain political institutions but there is still little consensus on
which institutions determine good governance more generally and how they
should be measured.1 One reason is that there is no agreed way to categorize
and measure bureaucratic institutions.2
A possible avenue are the institutions that regulate the selection and pro-
motion of bureaucrats. We call the selection by political leaders patronage.3
In this set-up bureaucrats can be hired, promoted and red by the politi-
cal leadership without institutional restrictions. However, in most developed
countries the bureaucracy is (at least partially) insulated from political inu-
ence. Institutions like state examinations for entry, objective standards for
promotion, ring restrictions guarded by a civil service commission all hin-
der political involvement with the declared aim of maximizing bureaucratic
competence. The institutions that guard central bank independence in many
countries are an example of insulation.
This article provides a theoretical model of political insulation to explain
why it, rstly, might raise bureaucratic e¢ ciency compared to patronage
and, secondly, why political leaders (politicians) choose to insulate the bu-
reaucracy. We start with the assumption that when politicians are able to
select bureaucrats they face a trade-o¤ between rent extraction and pub-
lic good provision. Our model shows that this trade-o¤ can hinder e¤ec-
tive competition for bureaucratic posts and leads to an underinvestment in
competence under patronage. Political insulation raises e¢ ciency because it
changes career incentives. Politicians introduce insulation if the lost rents
can be compensated by the increase in bureaucratic e¢ ciency. This is the
1This is illustrated by the World Banks governance indicator which is based on several
hundred individual variables coming from a wide variety of data sources. For a discussion
see Kaufmann et al. (2010).
2Rauch and Evans (2000) measure institutions for the recruitment and promotion of
bureaucrats directly through a questionaire. Typically, however, the literature has focused
on outcomes like corruption, bureaucratic delays or the share of tax revenues in GDP. The
most commonly used indicator of bureaucratic quality provided by the Political Risk Survey
Group (PRSG) is a mixture between outcomes and institutions.
3Patronage is dened here as the political allocation of posts in the bureaucracy. By
doing so we focus the discussion on the institutional set-up not the outcome that is also
attributed to the word patronage.
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case if the benet of public good provision compared to rent extraction is
high or if shared political power forces politicians to internalize the loss in
e¢ ciency that patronage entails.
We show that patronage is abolished if political power is shared among
di¤erent groups in society. An increase in political competition can therefore
raise bureaucratic e¢ ciency. Put di¤erently, our model points to a spill over
from competitive political institutions to e¢ cient bureaucratic institutions.
This nding stands in contrast to theoretical work which argues that polit-
ical competition can lead to an increase in the use of patronage and rising
ine¢ ciency.4 In order to support our theory we therefore discuss existing
evidence on political insulation. We also show that changes in bureaucratic
independence, measured as the political independence of the central bank
CEO, seem to follow changes in political competition in a large cross-section
of countries.
One of the main motivations is to try to understand why politicians give
up control over the selection of bureaucrats. We postulate that political
insulation is introduced if politicians want to commit future governments
not to meddle in selection. A key element in our argument is that political
selection leads to a bias in recruitment and promotion of bureaucrats which
harms bureaucratic e¢ ciency. We illustrate and support this argument with
a discussion of civil service reforms in the UK and a review of the empirical
literature.
Our model suggests that the benets of rent extraction relative to pub-
lic good provision (polarization) play an important role in insulation. High
levels of polarization lead to the adoption of bureaucratic institutions that
allow for political inuence and lower bureaucratic e¢ ciency. This nding
is in line the long term e¤ects of ethnic factionalization, civil wars and re-
source abundance. The possibility that changes in the political system spill
over into bureaucratic institutions also implies that an empirical measure of
insulation could explain some of the variation in the performance of political
institutions.5
We provide two extensions to the basic model. In the rst extension we
assume that specialization in competence is costly. We show that, somewhat
surprisingly, patronage can now lead to higher competence than insulation
4See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2010) discussed in Section 2.
5For similar ideas and corresponding evidence see Persson and Tabellini (2009) or Besley
and Kudamatsu (2010).
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if political competition is absent. However, it is only in the combination
between patronage and strong incumbent power that patronage performs
well. With strong political competition patronage is always less e¢ cient
than insulation.
In a second extension we endogenize political power in a simple voting
model with vested interest. We show that if the incumbent can mobilize
powerful vested interests, patronage is adopted to allow the incumbent to stay
in power. If the incumbent has very strong vested interests against himself
he can use bureaucratic insulation to dissipate political resistance. Insulation
dissipates opposition because it ensures that bureaucratic decisions are not
a¤ected by the political leadership. This highlights a surprising mechanism
in which bureaucratic reforms ll in for political reform.
The following section discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents
the basic model. This model is then extended in section 4. It is shown
rst that if bureaucrats are required to invest into competence the comple-
mentarities between the political and bureaucratic institutions increase. The
second extension endogenizes political power and shows that meritocracy can
be adopted to dissipate political resistance against the politician. Section 5
discusses new and existing empirical evidence in support of the theoretical
ndings. The last section discusses the results and important caveats.
2 Related Literature
Civil service institutions insulate the bureaucracy from the inuence of politi-
cians. A central pillar of this insulation are institutions that restrict hiring
and ring of bureaucrats. From the point of view of classic incentive the-
ory this seems to be a bad idea. Insulation harms the provision of sharp
incentives. Not surprisingly, the arising moral hazard problem has provided
a main motivation for research on bureaucracy.6
Accordingly, there is a large literature on why political insulation is
adopted nonetheless. One of the main arguments is provided by Moe (1989)
who posits that incumbents face uncertainty about their own grip on political
power in the future. This will prompt them to favor structures that insulate
their achievements from politics. Strong opposition in this framework will
6See, for example, Niskanen (1975) and Banerjee (1997). De Figueiredo (2002), for
example, argues explicitly that political insulation will reduce bureaucratic performance.
For an excellent review of the literature see Gailmard and Patty (2012).
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impose structures that subvert e¤ective performance and politicize agency
decisions. Stephenson (2008) argues formally that bureaucratic insulation
works as an insurance for the median voter against political uncertainty in-
duced by elections. Lavertu (2013) builds on these works and shows that
there is issue-specic variation in the degree of political insulation of the bu-
reaucracy. Relatively conict-ridden and volatile issue areas are politically
uncertain and the bureaucracy is therefore insulated. We deviate from this
viewpoint in that we argue that insulation enhances welfare, i.e. the oppo-
sition favours insulation compared to politicization. Changes in the political
institutions towards more competitiveness, like an expansion of the franchise,
will therefore tend to increase insulation and bureaucratic e¢ ciency.
In our framework insulation is adopted in order to guarantee an invest-
ment in expertise. Many scholars have stressed the importance of this invest-
ment.7 Our work is most closely related to work on discretion in by Gailmard
and Patty (2007) who model the decision of bureaucrats to invest in costly
expertise. They show that, in order to ensure competence, it can be rational
to grant discretion to bureaucrats despite the fact that bureaucrats with a
political bias will select into the bureaucracy.8 We focus on the selection
of bureaucrats under the assumption that bureaucrats enjoy discretion once
selected. In our focus on selection we are in line with theoretical work which
argues that promotions can be used to solve incentive problems within orga-
nizations.9 Alesina and Tabellini (2007), for example, argue that bureaucrats
are motivated by career incentives and contrast this to the re-election incen-
tives for politicians. We add to this literature by analyzing the incentives
of politicians to manipulate bureaucratic careers. In this way we are able
to analyze the impact of political institutions on the choice of bureaucratic
institutions and, hence, bureaucratic e¢ ciency.
We argue that the existence of a commitment problem not to meddle in
the selection of bureaucrats is the reason for why political insulation is so
common in developed states. While direct references to civil service institu-
tions are rare there are several theoretical works that relate to this argument.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that a commitment by the principal to follow
an agents advice will boost the latters incentives to gather information for
7Stephenson (2011), for example, stresses the importance of optimal investment in ex-
pertise. He also discusses optimal legal and procedural rules in a moral hazard framework.
8Bubb and Warren (2014) use a similar argument to explain why politicians appoint
bureaucrats with diverging policy views.
9See, for example, Dewatripoint et al (1999) and Laezer and Rosen (1981).
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this decision. Their ideas are similar to Max Webers vision of a bureau-
cracy in which formal authority is given to those with expertise. Konrad
and Torsvik (1997) show that a politician who plays a repeated contracting
game with a bureaucrat might want to commit not to learn about bureau-
crats type because this boosts the incentives for the bureaucrat to reveal
information in the earlier period of the game. They argue that the existence
of term limits for politicians might be explained with this commitment prob-
lem. Maskin and Tirole (2004) show that accountability of public decision
makers can lead to a welfare loss if it makes them pander to public opinion.
In their model the public uses the institution of a judge to commit not to
re a decision-maker that takes actions against the publics prior.
But if bureaucratic institutions are to solve a commitment problem they
have to be hard to reverse. Our model treats bureaucratic institutions as
a state variables that cannot be changed immediately. This assumption is
common in the literature on institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005),
for example, explain democratization through a commitment problem that
can only be solved through an institutionalized transfer of political power. In
their model, democratic institutions are a (political) state variable. A main
di¤erence of our work to the existing literature on state variables is that
political insulation improves e¢ ciency.10 In that sense civil service reform
can be regarded as a benecial investment in the competence of the bureau-
cracy.11 This puts our theory in line with Besley and Persson (2009) who
argue that the capacity of the state is due to an investment in this capacity.
In the empirical section we show that political changes towards more com-
petition indeed coincide with an institutional insulation of the central bank.12
This nding is in line with ndings in De Haan and Vant Hag (1995) who
show that measures of political instability correlate with central bank inde-
pendence (CBI) in the cross-section. Bernhard (1998) argues that CBI is
adopted to solve policy conicts between Government ministers and back-
bench legislators. He uses cross-country data to show that CBI is adopted
if government ministers, party legislators, and coalition partners have di¤er-
10See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for more classic references in the political economy
literature or Glazer (1989) for a discussion of the "durability" of political projects.
11The e¢ ciency gain can make meritocratic reform self-reenforcing if reversal destroys
the capacity to select by merit. A formal argument is available from the author upon
request.
12De Haan and Eij¢ nger (1996) provide an excellent overview over the literature on
both the causes and consequences of central bank independence.
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ent monetary policy incentives and if government ministers fear that party
legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy
dispute. We add to this in two ways. First, our argument applies also to
non-democracies. Secondly, we exploit changes across time in both political
institutions and institutions that determine central bank independence. In
this way we reduce concerns of omitted variable bias.13 Dreher et al (2010)
use a panel dataset on turnover of central bank governors for the years 1970-
2005 as a proxy for CBI. Amongst other things, they show that turnover
decreases with a higher the level of political instability, i.e. the more often
governments are being replaced. We focus instead on changes in the insti-
tutions that govern the recruitment of the governor. Given the commitment
power of institutions this is an important distinction.
In our main model we assume political power to be exogenous. This
stands in stark contrast to work by Acemoglu et al. (2010) who show that if
politicians have the power to provide jobs in government then political com-
petition can create stronger incentives to do so. Their model predicts more
ine¢ ciency from patronage with more political competition. This nding
is in line with other work that features endogenous political power like the
study of dictatorships presented in Debs (2010) or Guriev and Sonin (2009).
Both studies argue, in di¤erent contexts, that a strong dictator will promote
better inferiors than a weak dictator as he is less worried about a loss of
political power. A crucial di¤erence to this literature is that our ndings
suggest a positive correlation between bureaucratic e¢ ciency and political
competition.14
The assumption of politically motivated bureaucrats links our work to
theoretical work that analyzes the role of intrinsic motivation in public sector
performance.15 One key di¤erence is, however, that bureaucrats here are
driven by group-specic policy preferences not unlike the policy preference
in models of politicians or special interest groups. The main advantage of
this assumption from a modelling perspective is that the impact of political
recruitment bias under patronage is relatively robust to an expansion in the
number of bureaucrats who compete for a post.
13Our results are complementary to ndings by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) who nd
that a more competitive environment (more veto players) raises the e¤ectiveness of central
bank independence.
14However, we derive a similar nding in an extension of the model. If investments in
expertise are costly, strong incumbents are good for competence under patronage.
15See, for example, Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2000) or Prendergast (2007).
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3 Basic Model
3.1 Set-Up
Society consists of two groups of equal size identied by the parameter t 2
fA;Bg. Each of the two groups is politically represented by a politician of
their type, A and B respectively. In addition, two bureaucrats, one of each
type, compete for a post in the state bureaucracy. Selection for the post
allows the chosen bureaucrat to determine government policies which a¤ect
the whole of society. The full game has two periods and is structured as
follows.
The politician of type A (incumbent) is assumed to be in power in period
one. He remains in power with probability p 2 1
2
; 1

and is replaced by the
politician of type B otherwise.16 Parameter p measures the level of political
competition. High values of p can typically be associated with autocratic
regimes in which the opposition has no access to political power. Values of
p close to 1
2
, on the other hand, can be associated with more competitive
environments in which both politicians have a similar chance of being in
power in the next period.17
At the beginning of period one the incumbent chooses the bureaucratic
institutions, S 2 finsu; patrg, that govern bureaucratic recruitment in the
second period. Patronage (S = patr) implies that the politician in power
in period two can choose the bureaucrat. Under political insulation (S =
insu) this power is ceded to a neutral commission that is only interested in
bureaucratic competence.
Given S and p the two bureaucrats compete by specializing in one of two
policy dimensions - public good provision or rent extraction. If a bureaucrat
specialized on a policy dimension in period one she is able to provide a
successful policy on that dimension with probability h 2  1
2
; 1

.18 However,
16This probability is assumed to be exogenously given by political institutions in place.
Endogenous p is discussed as an extension. The assumption that p  12 is made only to
simplify the discussion of the results.
17Note that this is the denition of political competition used by most empirical studies.
The commonly used Polity IV data, for example, denes executive competitiveness as
giving "subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates" (Polity IV Project,
Dataset Users Manual, p. 18). Examples are hereditary succession (low competitiveness)
or elections (high competitiveness).
18Expertize has, thus, a similar role as in Aghion and Tirole (1997). The main di¤erences
here are that policy is two dimensional and that the politician never inuences policies. An
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specialization is never perfect in the sense that there is a positive likelihood
of 1  h that she provides a successful policy on the other policy dimension
in period two. The successful provision of public goods by the bureaucrat
pays one to every member of society regardless of their type. Policy success
in rent-extraction pays  > 0 to the group of the bureaucrat and   to the
other group. Assume for now that specialization costs on both dimensions
are equal (to zero).
A bureaucrat is dened as competent if she specialized on the dimension
of public good provision in period one. Denote the level of competence by
et 2 fh; 1  hg. The selection of a competent type A bureaucrat (eA = h)
then implies, for example, that the public good is provided with probability
h > 1
2
while rents are extracted from group B with probability 1   h < 1
2
.
A high level of et is best thought of as a high level of skill in the drafting
and implementation of public policies. A bureaucrat with high levels of et
has invested in a particular eld of expertise, like the implementation of
infrastructure projects or the setting of the central bank interest rate. Low
levels of et reect the development of strong social and professional ties with
particular interest groups. Bureaucrats with low et therefore know how to
favour or milk particular sectors of the economy through public policies. We
treat both high and low et as equally costly only to simplify the analysis.
Costly competence is discussed in the extensions.
The expected utility for all individuals (including the bureaucrat) of group
t from a bureaucrat of type t and competence et is
EUt(t; et) = et + (1  et)  (1)
where the rst term represents the expected benet from public good provi-
sion and the second term the expected benet from rent extraction. Anal-
ogously, the expected utility for group t from a bureaucrat of type  t with
competence e t is
EUt( t; e t) = e t   (1  e t)  . (2)
Equation (2) shows that the expected utility provided by a bureaucrat
from the opposition is always increasing in her competence. This is because
both increased public good provision and decreasing rent extraction by a
analysis which endogenizes the distribution of authority between politician and bureaucrat
seems attractive but lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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bureaucrat of type  t benet a member of group t. Expected utility in
equation (1), however, is only increasing in competence, et, if  < 1. Thus,
the parameter  measures the extent to which rent extraction implies higher
benets than public good provision. High values of  could be either due
to large rents (abundant natural resources, low cost of repression, etc.) or
small public good gains (heterogeneous tastes, low demand for public goods
etc.). We call society more polarized if  is larger. According to this deni-
tion, bureaucrats in a polarized society (  1) benet less from public good
provision than from extracting rents. When specializing, these bureaucrats
are therefore tempted to focus on rent extraction.19
The variable h is a measure for the level of specialization in public good
provision and rent extraction. For h close to 1
2
the actual specialization of
the bureaucrat does not matter very much. If public good provision requires
very di¤erent skills than rent extraction h will be high. In this way the model
is able to capture a situation where competence is general and not specic
to either public good provision or rent extraction.
To end the description of the model, the sequencing of the actions is
as follows. The incumbent rst chooses the bureaucratic system S. Then,
given S, the two bureaucrats simultaneously decide on their specialization
et; t = A;B. The political process determines the politician for period two.
One of the two bureaucrats is recruited according to the rules of S and this
bureaucrat implements policies that yield expected payo¤s in equations (1)
and (2). The next section shows that this game has a unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium. Backwards induction requires that bureaucratic recruit-
ment in period two and the specialization decisions are discussed rst. The
combination of both then determines bureaucratic performance of patronage
and insulation.
3.2 Bureaucratic E¢ ciency
A discussion of bureaucratic performance is most useful in the light of the
rst best. We assume that public goods are non-excludable, i.e. the politician
does not internalize the overall benets of public good provision. This drives
a wedge between the politicians utility in equations (1) and (2) and overall
19Note also that for et = e t = e the di¤erence in expected utilities EUt(t; e) EUt( t; e)
is decreasing in e. This captures the idea that an overall specialization in rent extraction
(e = 1  h) radicalizes the political environment because bureaucrats transfer more rents
towards their group.
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welfare. Given that both groups in society are of equal size, a social planner
who maximizes welfare would always want to select a competent bureaucrat
in period two (et = h) regardless of the type t. Failure in recruiting a
competent bureaucrat leads to a per capita welfare loss of h (1  h) = 2h 1.
This is due to the fact that rent extraction is welfare neutral while public
good provision improves overall welfare.
Political insulation is assumed to give all recruitment powers to a neutral
commission that is only interested in competence. Assume that the com-
mission chooses the candidate with the highest level of competence, et, and
randomizes otherwise. We assume that if both bureaucrats have the same
level of competence each one of them gets recruited with probability 1
2
.
Patronage gives the right of selecting the bureaucrat to the politician
in power in period two. Clearly, politicians have an incentive to recruit
a bureaucrat of their own type because she will distribute rents towards
their group. This group-specic interest can clash with the selection by
competence.
Lemma 1 Bureaucratic recruitment under patronage is politically biased if
  2h   1. A politician of type t 2 fA;Bg then fails to recruit the more
competent bureaucrat if that bureaucrat is of a di¤erent type.
Proof. Denote the level of competence of the two bureaucrats by et; e t
2 fh; 1  hg. A politician of type t selects his own type of bureaucrat if
et +  (1  et)  e t    (1  e t) :
Insert et = 1 h and e t = h. With these levels of competence the condition
can be re-written into   2h  1.
Lemma 1 explains why patronage can fail to recruit competent bureau-
crats. The reason is that the politician might have to choose between a
bureaucrat who would allocate rents to his group and a bureaucrat who is
more competent. If rents are important (  2h 1) bureaucratic competence
is ignored.
An immediate e¤ect of the bias described in lemma 1 is that recruitment
under patronage is fully determined by the type of politician in power. For
all   2h  1 politicians of type t always choose bureaucrats of type t. This
can have consequences for bureaucratic competence under patronage.
Proposition 1 Under patronage bureaucrats specialize in rent extraction
(eA;B = 1  h) if and only if   1. They never specialize in rent extraction
when politically insulated.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 gives a possible explanation for why political insulation is
often regarded as the better bureaucratic system. Patronage can imply that
the bureaucrats specialize in extracting rents from the political opposition if
these rents exceed the benet from public good provision. From a welfare
perspective this creates a loss of resources due to bureaucratic incompetence.
The political bias discussed in lemma 1 is at the heart of this failure of
patronage. Given that patronage recruits by type and not by competence
there is e¤ectively no competition between bureaucrats of di¤erent types.
Polarization creates a labor market monopsony for bureaucrats with the cor-
rect type and, hence, bureaucrats know that they do not compete against
bureaucrats with di¤erent policy preferences.
In a politically insulated system, competence can prevent the compet-
ing candidate from taking the bureaucratic post and implementing rent ex-
traction in her favor. As both bureaucrats compete on an equal footing,
polarization now works as an incentive for a specialization in competence.
Note that if  < 1 e¢ ciency can be reached without giving bureaucrats
additional incentives for specializing in competence. In order to focus on the
interesting case we therefore make the assumption
A1 :   1:
This assumption implies two things. First, bureaucrats will specialize in
rent extraction when left to their own devices. Secondly, politicians cannot
commit to recruit by competence in period two. As a result patronage is
ine¢ cient. We discuss the case of  < 1 at the end of the following section.
Given that patronage leads to a specialization in rent extraction the ques-
tion arises whether the incumbent might still choose it as bureaucratic sys-
tem. The next section shows that the incumbents decision is closely related
to the level of political competition p and polarization  .
3.3 Political Competition and Bureaucratic Institutions
In the rst period the incumbent tries to a¤ect outcomes in the second pe-
riod by choosing the set of bureaucratic institutions, S 2 finsu; patrg. By
proposition 1 and A1 his expected utility from patronage is
EUA (S = patr; p; ) = p (1  h+ h) + (1  p) (1  h  h) : (3)
12
His expected utility from political insulation is
EUA (S = insu; ) =
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h)) : (4)
Note rst that under patronage both governments always recruit a bu-
reaucrat of their own type in period 2. This implies that if group A is more
powerful (higher p) then the likelihood that bureaucrat A gets the post in
period 2 is also higher. As p increases the incumbent can therefore expect
more rents to be distributed towards the group he represents. Under politi-
cal insulation both bureaucrats are selected with probability 1
2
. At the same
time bureaucratic e¢ ciency is ensured. If expected political rents are low
(because of low p and ) the politician faces a commitment problem. He
prefers competence to political recruitment but cannot commit the future
government to recruit by competence under patronage. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 2 Assume A1 holds. The bureaucracy is politically insulated
by the incumbent if
2h  1
h
 (2p  1)  : (5)
Proof. See the appendix.
Condition (5) has an immediate intuitive interpretation. On the left
hand side of condition (5) stands the relative gain in e¢ ciency due to higher
competence, h (1 h)
h
. The bureaucracy is politically insulated if this gain
compensates for the loss in expected political rents.
Corollary 1 Shared political power (lower p) makes political insulation more
attractive. There is a unique level of political power
~p =
1
2
+
2h  1
2h
at which the incumbent is indi¤erent between political insulation and patron-
age. For all values of p  ~p; ~p 2  1
2
; 1

the bureaucracy is insulated.
Corollary 1 suggests a simple link between political and bureaucratic in-
stitutions (p and S respectively). If political institutions exclude access to
political power for the opposition (p = 1) political insulation is impossible.
An autocrat who knows that his absolute powers shield the bureaucracy from
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political inuence by the opposition never introduces institutions like state
exams or a civil service commission as these institutions would restrict his
control over recruitment. Political insulation is only put in place if the in-
cumbent is competing against other groups, i.e. if he knows there is a good
chance that the opposition will come to power in the next period. Note that
~p > 1
2
, i.e. the incumbent insulates the bureaucracy even if that diminishes
the likelihood that a bureaucrat from his group is recruited in period 2. In
other words, the incumbent buys e¢ ciency with a loss of political inuence
over the bureaucracy.
Corollary 2 A large potential for rent extraction compared to public good
provision (high ) reduces the likelihood that the bureaucracy is politically
insulated.
Corollary 2 follows immediately from condition (5). Higher polarization
leads to a lower likelihood of insulation. In other words, the adoption of
inferior bureaucratic institutions is more likely with the rising importance of
rents.
Note that corollary 2 relies on assumption A1. If  < 1 bureaucrats are
not tempted to specialize in rent extraction - regardless of the incentives
given by the bureaucracy. In other words, political insulation does not imply
an improvement in bureaucratic e¢ ciency in this case. As both bureaucrats
always specialize in public good provision the incumbent insulates only if p <
1
2
and polarization has no impact on the adoption of civil service reforms.20
Corollary 1 implies that changes in political institutions can lead to an in-
crease in bureaucratic e¢ ciency because they lead to changes in bureaucratic
institutions. A lot of the debate around the economic e¤ects of democratiza-
tion ignores this second-order e¤ect. However, corollary 2 suggests that the
association between democratization and bureaucratic e¢ ciency will depend
on whether the implied reduction in p can compensate for lost rents. Here the
level of polarization can play for or against an impact of democratization.
To see this note, for example, that ~p converges towards 1
2
as polarization
increases. In very polarized societies a spill-over from democratization to
political insulation is therefore unlikely as long as the incumbent enjoys at
least some advantage over his competitor.
20To see this note that if both bureaucratic institutions provide the same level of com-
petence insulation is identical to patronage with p = 12 :
14
In summary, the model delivers a micro-foundation for the choice of in-
ferior bureaucratic institutions and how this choice links to the political sit-
uation of a country. Absolutist political institutions and high potential for
rent extraction lead to a choice of ine¢ cient bureaucratic institutions which
are geared towards the extraction of these rents. Political reforms can lead
to an improvement of bureaucratic performance if they give a diverse set of
groups access to political power. According to the model, political competi-
tion can imply that the political elite of a country adopts political insulation,
bureaucratic e¢ ciency increases and rent-extraction decreases.
4 Extensions
4.1 Costly Investment in Competence
There is a recent literature on dictators which argues that stronger dictators
might improve bureaucratic e¢ ciency.21 One way to reconcile this view with
our results is to assume that a specialization in competence is more costly
than a specialization in rent extraction. This is particularly plausible where
public good provision requires more expertise that is specic to the public
sector.
Assume that competence costs the bureaucrat c regardless of whether she
is selected for the post or not. Assume biased recruitment under patronage
(  2h  1). The candidate of type t = A now invests in competence if
p (2h  1) (1  ) > c
while candidate B invests in competence if
(1  p) (2h  1) (1  ) > c
which illustrates the fact that the strength of the patron (p or 1   p) now
directly increases investment incentives. Political institutions now directly
a¤ect the level of competence under patronage because bureaucrats know
that the return on their investment in competence depends on the probability
of being hired in the next period.
Under insulation investment incentives are independent of p. We show in
the appendix that for a range
c 2 [ (1  h) ; 2h  1 +  (1  h)]
21See our discussion in Section 2.
15
there are multiple equilibria in investment. There are two asymmetric equi-
libria in which only one of the candidates invests with certainty. In these
equilibria insulation always dominates patronage in terms of welfare. How-
ever, there is a third equilibrium in which the two candidates play a mixed
strategy and invest with probability
Pr(et = h) = 1  c   (1  h)
2h  1 : (6)
In this equilibrium patronage can dominate insulation.
Proposition 3 Assume costly investments in competence at cost c. Without
political competition (p close to 1), patronage can lead to higher competence
than insulation if
2h  1  h > 0
and if c is in a range of costs c 2 [c
¯
; c]. Patronage never leads to higher
competence with shared political power (p close to 1
2
).
Proof. See the appendix.
We illustrate the proposition in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the
level of competence under insulation (solid line) and patronage (dashed line)
for di¤erent values of c and a monopoly of power (p = 1). For investment
costs below c
¯
both insulation and patronage lead to high competence. If
investment costs are in the range c 2 [c
¯
; c] competence under insulation falls
because the probability of investment in competence, given by equation (6),
falls whereas it remains high under patronage. This is a surprise given our
earlier results. Competition for the post under insulation implies a degree
of risk for the candidates which lowers investment incentives. Competence
under patronage falls at c = (2h  1) (1  ). At this point the type A
candidate stops to invest despite guaranteed recruitment. For all c > c both
institutions lead to an incompetent bureaucracy.
The situation of a weak incumbent (p = 1
2
) is illustrated in Figure 2.
Now the point at which investment breaks down has shifted to the left under
patronage but has remained unchanged under insulation. As a result, there
is no value of c at which competence is higher under patronage than under
insulation.
The main intuition behind proposition 3 is that since specialization in
competence is costly, a bureaucrat will only invest in competence if she is
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su¢ ciently condent that this competence will be put to use. Under patron-
age, a lack of political competition can therefore work as a guarantee that
the candidates investment will pay o¤. In this way patronage can welfare
dominate insulation under p = 1. However, it only does so for strong incum-
bents. In other words, it is only in the combination between patronage and
strong incumbent power that patronage performs well. When p = 1
2
patron-
age does neither provide guaranteed recruitment nor competition between
the candidates and is therefore always welfare dominated.22
Proposition 3 is important because it reinforces the notion that political
and bureaucratic institutions are complementary. An absolutist ruler can
guarantee to hire his group and, thus, maximizes their incentives to invest
into competence. This incentive can be so strong that welfare is higher
under patronage than under insulation. However, if political power is shared,
patrons are weak. Patronage then harms competence and insulation welfare
dominates because it does not rely on the absence of political competition to
provide investment incentives.
The incentives of the incumbent to adopt insulation are similar to the
main model. Without political competition the incumbent always adopts
patronage. If power is shared the incumbent always wants to insulate the
bureaucracy. We discuss the adoption decision in more detail in the appendix.
4.2 Endogenous Political Power
Patronage is often referred to as the use of spoils to gather political support.
Acemoglu et al (2010), for example, use this view on patronage to provide a
theory of ine¢ cient states. This section incorporates this view by making p
endogenous to the choice of bureaucratic system.
The political process is modelled as a voting game. There are three kinds
of voters. The rst kind is only interested in public good provision and votes
for the politician that is expected to provide the highest benet on that policy
dimension. This group has a mass of 1  .
The second group of voters has a mass of  and votes for the politician
that promises most rents. Voters of this type can be thought of as forming
the power-base of the respective politicians. They will always support their
22For intermediate values of p there is no clear-cut comparison between patronage and
insulation in terms of competence. This is because competence jumps twice under patron-
age. We discuss this in the appendix.
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type of politician if this politician has control over spoils. This is because
the opposing politician cannot commit to provide spoils after the election.
For now assume that the political system is biased in the sense that a share
 2 1
2
; 1

of these voters are of type t = A.
Uncertainty in the political process is modelled through a third group
of noise voters whose votes lead to an aggregate shock of votes " for the
politician of type B. Assume that this shock is distributed uniformly on the
interval [ 1; 1].
The game structure is as follows. First, the incumbent chooses the bu-
reaucratic system. Second, the rst two voter types support their preferred
candidate. Finally, bureaucrats specialize before the uncertainty introduced
by the third voter type gets resolved. Indi¤erent voters are assumed to ran-
domize their vote.
Under insulation the identity of the politician in the second stage has
no impact on outcomes and all decisions are made as before. In particular,
both bureaucrats always invest into competence by proposition (1) regardless
of which group is more powerful. The incumbents expected utility from
S = insu remains unchanged and is given by
EUA (S = insu; ) =
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h)) :
We maintain assumption A1. Under patronage all voters interested in
rents vote for a candidate of their own type. Competence between the two
bureaucrats is identical. The incumbent therefore wins the election if
+
1
2
(1  )   (1  ) + 1
2
(1  ) + "
or
"   (2  1) :
Given that " is distributed uniformly on the interval [ 1; 1] the probability
of re-election under patronage can then be written
p (patr; ; ) =
1
2
+
 (2  1)
2
while under insulation it is
p (insu; ; ) =
1
2
:
The following result follows immediately.
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Proposition 4 Assume A1. The bureaucracy is politically insulated if and
only if
2h  1
h
  (2  1)  .
Proof. See appendix.
The main novelty in proposition 4 is that as spoils become more important
for political outcomes (rising ) insulation is less likely. This is because the
politician is not in control of spoils if the bureaucracy is insulated. If vested
interests are the natural allies of the incumbent ( close to 1) this factor can
prevent insulation. Ine¢ cient bureaucratic institutions are then adopted to
allow the political elite to stay in power.
Additional insights can be gained from the case in which  < 1
2
. In this
case the probability of re-election under patronage is
p (patr; ; ) <
1
2
while it remains p (insu; ; ) = 1
2
with an insulated bureaucracy. If the in-
cumbent has strong vested interests against himself he can use bureaucratic
insulation to dissipate political resistance. Insulation works because it en-
sures that bureaucratic decisions are not a¤ected by the political leadership.
Powerful interests that oppose the incumbent then know that rents might be
distributed in their favor. This highlights a surprising mechanism in which
bureaucratic reforms ll in for political change.
There are two important cases that might be explained by this reverse
causality argument - Prussia and Imperial China. It has been argued that
Prussian feudalism might have survived so long because of a relatively in-
sulated bureaucracy. The rising classes were less willing to stage revolution
because they were able to reach relatively inuential positions in the powerful
bureaucracy.23 Similarly, Northern Sung rulers chose civil service examina-
tions to limit the development of alternative power centers by drawing into
their government the sons of elites from newly emerging regions in South
China.24 In both cases autocrats introduced bureaucratic reforms to prevent
political opposition.
23One sign of this access is that young men were able to marry noble women once they
rose inside the state bureaucracy. For a more detailed discussion see Haas (2004).
24See Elman (1991). Bai and Jia (2014) argue empirically that this mechanism led to
an increase in revolutionary tendencies in China after the abolishment of state exams.
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5 Empirical Evidence
The model provides two main testable propositions. Proposition 1 predicts
that patronage leads to bureaucratic ine¢ ciency because it alters career in-
centives. Proposition 2 states that shared political power and decreasing
polarization make insulation more likely. This section discusses the empiri-
cal evidence on these two sets of hypothesis separately.
5.1 Political Interference and Bureaucratic Performance
In the 19th century Great Britain introduced state exams and a civil service
commission - both of these institutional features reduced political control over
recruitment with the declared aim of increasing competence. The arguments
surrounding these reforms are well documented and can therefore give an
insight into the motivation behind actual civil service reforms.
At the beginning of the 19th century patronage was the norm in Great
Britain while objective criteria hardly played any role in recruitment into the
bureaucracy.25 The struggle for the introduction of a merit system began in
1853 when Charles Trevelyan and Sta¤ord Northcote were asked by the then
Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Gladstone, to write a report on its
recruitment and promotion.26 The resulting report, published in 1854, urges
for insulation with the following argument.
It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government
of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an e¢ cient body
of permanent o¢ cers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the
Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet
possessing su¢ cient independence, character, ability, and experience to be
able to advise, assist, and to some extent, inuence, those who are from time
to time set over them.27
There is no doubt that Northcote and Trevelyan aimed at insulating the
British bureaucracy from political inuence. One of their contemporaries,
25An indication of the lax standards in recruitment is a minute of the treasury from
the year 1820 mentioned by Greaves (1947). The document stresses that men previously
convicted of revenue o¤ences should not be appointed as customs o¢ cials.
26One potential reason for the reform e¤ort was bad bureaucratic performance. Accord-
ing to Clark (1959) the report came at a time in which stories of bureaucratic incompetence
were increasingly common.
27Northcote and Trevelyan (1954), p. 1 (reprint)
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John Stuart Mill, praised reforms in the East India company as follows.28
A second great advantage of the present system is, that those who are
sent out as candidates to rise by degrees are generally unconnected with the
inuential classes in the country, and out of the range of Parliamentary
inuence. The consequence is, that those who have the disposal of o¢ ces in
India have little or no motive to put unt persons into important situations
[...]29
Thus, not only were reformers in Great Britain aware of political incen-
tives to promote unt personal, they saw political independence as a way
to improve performance in this context. Two recent empirical studies lend
support for this mechanism. Iyer and Mani (2012) study transfers in the top
layers of the Indian civil service between 1980 and 2004. They show rst
that the reallocation of posts in the Indian bureaucracy is correlated with
political change - i.e. even in a system geared towards selection by merit
politicians use the leverage they have to alter careers. The clearest division
line for political interests in India is caste membership. Consistent with the
idea that this political division creates a labor market monopoly for members
of the "right" caste, Iyer and Mani nd that o¢ cers are more likely to be
appointed to important positions when they belong to the same caste as the
Chief Ministers party base.
What are the e¢ ciency costs of this politicization? While direct evidence
is di¢ cult to establish, Iyer and Mani provide some evidence that career
incentives are indeed altered by the political allocation of posts. They show
that bureaucrats who can expect to have more politicized careers (i.e. careers
that depend more on political change) invest less in expertise. Their study
also lends some support for the fact that the performance of government
agencies su¤ers from more politicization.
In addition to this detailed study there are several cross-sectional empir-
ical studies that lend support for the idea that political insulation improves
performance. Lewis (2007) uses the scores of an evaluation program initiated
by the Bush administration in 2004 to measure program performance. He
nds that politically appointed managers perform signicantly worse than
career civil servants.30 He shows that the best proxy to explain this di¤er-
28See Ryan (1972) for a revealing account of Mills arguements and his inuence on the
Northcote Trevelyan report.
29J.S.Mill, cited in Ryan (1972), p. 44
30Lewis (2007) controls for program type, size, bureau types and whether programs were
initiated under a Democrat president or at times of divided government. He also attempts
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ence is the higher bureau experience that civil servants bring to the table.
In a cross country study Rauch and Evans (2000) nd that meritocratic re-
cruitment (recruitment by state exams) correlates closely and robustly with
measures of bureaucratic performance.
5.2 When do Politicians Introduce Insulation?
Our theory provides comparative statics regarding the e¤ect of political com-
petition on the use of patronage that are in conict with existing theoretical
work on the topic. In this section we therefore provide some evidence that
political competition leads to insulation as proposition 2 suggests. In addi-
tion, we relate our results on the role of polarization to recent discourses in
the literature.
Barbara Geddes book Politicians dilemma: Building state capacity in
Latin America provides a detailed account of bureaucratic reforms in Latin
America. She nds support for the idea that insulation was introduced in
Latin America when new political groups gained access to political power. In
Venezuela, for example, a civil service reform was drafted in 1960 after the
dominant political party, Democratic Action (AD), had lost a large share
of its seats in the Venezuelan chamber of deputies. Civil service reforms
were implemented once the AD drew equal to its main political competitor
in 1968,31 but then reversed by presidential decree when the AD returned
to its dominant role in 1973. Such a reversal is a good indicator that po-
litical competition can be an important factor for changes in bureaucratic
institutions.32
Another example of the relationship between political and bureaucratic
reform is the case of Great Britain discussed in the previous section. The
Northcote and Trevelyan report was written at a time of radical political
changes in the 19th century. The middle classes had gained the right to
vote in the rst reform act in 1832. In addition, the prerogative power of the
to rule out endogeneity by using instrumental variables.
31Data is from Geddes (1994) shows that the seat share of the AD in the Venezuelan
chamber of debuties fell from 54.9 percent in 1958 to 36.3 percent in 1963 and further to
29.6 in 1968. The second strongest party, COPEI, received 14.3, 22.3 and 27.7 percent of
the seats respectively.
32More reversals are discussed in Geddes (1994) or Bekke and Van Der Meer (2002).
In Spain, for example, meritocratic institutions were introduced in the relatively chaotic
political environment of the 1910s but later reversed under dictatorship.
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crown had come to be increasingly taken over by ministers who could be held
accountable by parliament. Thus, the executive had become more volatile in
the interests it represented both because new groups had entered the political
arena and because institutional changes facilitated their access to executive
power. In 1854 Northcote and Trevelyan proposed to modify recruitment
procedures through the introduction of an entry examination for all public
servants, administered by an independent Board of Examiners. Reforms,
however, did not take place because parliament resisted their implementation.
State exams were not introduced until 1870 - in the middle of a wave of
political reforms that would guarantee representatives of the working class
access to parliament.33 One interpretation of this timing of events is that
the established members of parliament feared that the control over political
recruitment could fall into the hands of the middle and working classes. As
their political power was fading, the members of parliament preferred to
transfer the power of bureaucratic recruitment to a neutral body.
In addition to these detailed accounts there is empirical evidence from
within-country studies that indicate that politicians prefer to insulate if their
political power is challenged. Hanssen (2004), for example, studies the insti-
tutions governing the appointment of judges in the United States between
1950 and 1990. He shows that institutions that increase judicial indepen-
dence from politics tend to be implemented in states that feature compet-
itive politics and conrms this pattern with time variation available in the
data. Similarly, Ruhil and Camoes (2003) show that electoral competition
was a key predictor of insulation at the state level in the United States. One
standard deviation in closeness of elections more than doubled the chance
that a state adopted competitive state examinations between 1900 and 1939.
In order to test whether these patterns appear more generally we need
measures of both political competition and bureaucratic institutions which
are consistent across countries. Sadly, there is little available data that quan-
ties specic bureaucratic institutions for a large set of countries.34 The most
commonly used data on bureaucratic quality is provided by the Policy Risk
Survey Group (PRSG) but the group does not state which institutions ex-
actly are responsible for high bureaucratic quality. This makes the data less
useful for testing the link between political competition and specic bureau-
33See Justman and Gradstein (1999) for a detailed account of the increasing represen-
tativeness of the British parliament.
34Rauch and Evans (2000) provide data that measure the use of state exams specically
but only for a relatively small set of countries.
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cratic institutions.35 The concern can be avoided with data on Central Bank
Independence (CBI) provided by Cukierman et al (1992) and Crowe and
Maede (2008). Their measure of CBI contains a category which seeks to
measure the independence of the Central Bank CEO from political interfer-
ence on a 0 to 1 scale.36 Most economists would agree that political selection
might hinder e¢ ciency in this bureaucratic post.
In order to show that political competition is related to bureaucratic
independence it is important to nd a relatively precise measure of the po-
litical institutions we have in mind.37 The measure most closely related to
our concept of political competition is the index of competitiveness of execu-
tive recruitment provided by the Polity IV project. According to the Polity
IV manual "Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of ad-
vancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates."38
The codebook distinguishes between fair elections of the chief executive (the
top layer of government) and selection through hereditary succession, desig-
nation or rigged election. Table 1, column (1) shows the correlation of CEO
independence in 2003 with the average extent of political competition for
the years 1998 till 2003.39 The coe¢ cient suggests that an increase of politi-
cal competition by one standard deviation implies half a standard deviation
increase in bureaucratic independence. Column (2) shows that this simple
correlation is robust to controlling for GDP per capita and past ination.
Column (3) reveals that running the same regression for the 1980s yields
identical results. Interestingly, the extent of political competition in this ear-
lier period does not predict CEO independence in 2003 (column (4)). The
underlying reason is considerable change both in political competitiveness
and bureaucratic independence between the 1980s and 2003. Column (5)
conrms that an increase in political competition within this relatively small
period of time went hand in hand with insulation even when controlling for
changes in GDP per capita. This suggests a link between competitiveness
35It should be noted that, consistent with proposition 2, bureaucratic quality is corre-
lated with measures of democratization.
36The index combines length of CEO tenure, the question of who appoints the CEO,
who controls CEO dismissal and whether the CEO can hold other o¢ ces in government.
37For a discussion of the econometric problems caused by broad proxies see Acemoglu
(2005).
38Polity IV manual, page 21.
39We drop observations that feature wars, revolutions and unregulated competition.
Results also hold for the overall Polity IV index and the freedom house index.
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and bureaucratic independence in the direction suggested by our theory.
Evidence on the connection between polarization and bureaucratic insti-
tutions is relatively sparse. While there is a wealth of work in development
economics that studies the negative impact of variables like inequality, re-
source rents and ethnic divisions on economic outcomes our theory suggests
that the e¤ect should be coming through the capacity of the state to provide
public goods as opposed to extracting rents. The most direct evidence here
comes from Alesina et al (1999) who study the impact of ethnic fractional-
ization on the provision of public goods in United States cities, metropolitan
areas and urban counties. They show that the share of spending on produc-
tive public goods declines with ethnic factionalization and suggest that this
might be driven by an increase in spending motivated by patronage in these
jurisdictions.
Note that we modelled polarization as the benets from rent extraction
relative to the benets of public goods provision. An intriguing application
of this view is the military. To see this, note that the denition of polar-
ization here captures the di¤erence between external and internal wars. If
an external war looms, all members of society would su¤er a huge loss if
national defence is not successful. Thus, the present government wants to
recruit the military by merit because this maximizes defence (public good
provision). In a civil war the government wants to recruit the military by
patronage because it wants to be sure that the hired military is loyal, i.e. the
group-specic control of rents is more important than maximizing the over-
all level of military competence. Here our theory closely relates to ndings
by Besley and Persson (2009) who show in a cross-section of countries that
measures of state capacity correlate positively with past external conict but
negatively with internal conict.
Abundance of natural resources is another example of an environment
with high rents. And indeed there are several case studies that link resource
booms to increasing patronage. Robinson et al (2006), for example, sum-
marize several case studies to show how resource booms lead to politically
motivated expansions of the public sector. A particularly revealing account
comes from Ross (2001) who shows that countries in Southeast Asia disman-
tled existing forestry institutions (laws, regulations and departments) and
increased patronage in the face of timber price shocks. He shows how in-
stitutions insulating the forestry bureaucracy from political pressures were
dismantled in the Philippines and Malaysia by politicians in order to gain
access to resource rents.
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6 Discussion
This article stresses the importance of recruitment and promotion in the
bureaucracy. Two sets of institutions, insulation and patronage, have been
modelled with the aim to analyze their impact on economic welfare and
their relationship with political institutions such as elections. The model
shows that insulation performs better if patronage leads to a political bias in
recruitment which hinders competition for bureaucratic posts by competence.
If this gain in e¢ ciency is important, politicians want to commit the future
government to recruit by competence. Political insulation is then chosen as
a commitment device.
The main nding in the model is that political institutions can have an
important e¤ect on the trade-o¤ between policial control and competence. If
political competition threatens the power of the incumbent he will be more
inclined to give up the power of controlling selection for a gain in competence.
In this way political reform can trigger bureaucratic reforms. Using a dataset
on central bank independence we have shown that changes in central bank
independence indeed trace changes in political competition.
A crucial assumption in our model is that insulation binds the hands of
future governments. There are several features of civil service institutions
that justify this assumption. First, the transfer of power to an independent
civil service commission and the promise to bureaucrats of a life long career
by merit creates a vested interest in the survival of the system. Secondly,
civil service institutions have an informational dimension. The entry by exam
and promotion by tenure or merit keeps information about the bureaucrats
preferences from politicians.40 As the signal on types received by politicians
is weak patronage is less attractive. Thirdly, insulation is an investment
that increases e¢ ciency. This can strengthen incentives to maintain these
institutions.
One drawback of the present model is that it takes political power as
exogenously given. This drawback is partly alleviated in a second extension
which analyzes the case where the choice of bureaucratic institutions feeds
back to political support for the politician. The extension highlights the fact
that bureaucratic systems can both increase and decrease political conict.
Patronage increases the stakes of the political game while insulation reduces
40The US Pendleton Act of 1883, for example, stresses explicitly that no recommendation
letters are to be handed in for an applicant to the civil service.
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them. Political mobilization can therefore become an additional incentive to
implement ine¢ cient patronage.
A possible criticism regarding the categorization of bureaucratic institu-
tions is that political insulation and patronage could be combined to prevent
a trade-o¤ between political preference and competence.41 In the presented
model a pre-selection according to objective criteria followed by a choice by
the political elite would perform as well as insulation in terms of welfare.
However, the e¢ ciency of political selection then relies on the fact that the
two candidates have exactly the same level of competence. In reality, in-
sulation will never lead to two candidates with exactly the same level of
competence. The trade-o¤ between competence and political preference will
persist.
We argue that bureaucratic institutions of recruitment and promotion
have an independent e¤ect on the capacity of the state to provide public
goods. A categorization and measurement of bureaucratic institutions might
therefore provide a stepping stone in understanding state capacity.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Note rst that   1 implies   2h 1 so that recruitment under patronage
is biased. Given a level of competence eB the candidate of type A wants to
specialize in rent extraction if
p (h+  (1  h)) + (1  p) (eB    (1  eB))
 p (1  h+ h) + (1  p) (eB    (1  eB))
which is the case if and only if   1. Independence of p and eB implies that
the candidate of type B has exactly the same incentives and specializes in
rent extraction if and only if   1. For levels of polarization  < 2h   1
patronage is unbiased and selects politically only when both bureaucrats are
of equal competence. It can be shown that both candidates specialize in
public good provision in that case.
Under insulation there are two cases to be considered. Given that the
candidate of type  t is competent the candidate of of type t also wants to
41Indeed, most bureaucracies feature a mixture of both extremes portrayed here. In
modern civil service systems, for example, bureaucrats enter through a state exam but
their careers are not immune to political changes. The posts they get, possibly even
promotions, depend on changes in political power.
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be competent if
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h))
> h   (1  h)
or
 (1  h) > 0:
And if the other candidate does not specialize in public good provision the
candidate of type t wants to be competent if
h+  (1  h)
>
1
2
(1  h+ h) + 1
2
(1  h  h)
or
2h  1 +  (1  h) > 0:
Note that h 2  1
2
; 1

and  > 0. Hence, both competence conditions are
satised which implies that both candidates have a weakly dominant strategy
of specializing in public good provision, et = e t = h.
B Proof of Proposition 2
For values of   1 patronage leads to incompetent bureaucrats by proposi-
tion 1. The incumbent then introduces insulation if
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h))
 p (1  h+ h) + (1  p) (1  h  h)
or
2h  1
h
 (2p  1)  :
C Proof to Proposition 3
The candidate of type A invests in competence if
p (2h  1) (1  ) > c
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while candidate B invests in competence if
(1  p) (2h  1) (1  ) > c:
Since p  1
2
we have incompetence in patronage for all
p (2h  1) (1  )  c
which is always satised for c > 0 and  su¢ ciently large (note that incom-
petence now appears already at some  < 1).
Under insulation the investment decision of the candidates depends on
the other candidate. Type t invests given that  t invests if
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h))  c
> h   (1  h)
or
 (1  h) > c
while she invests given that the other candidate does not invest if
h+  (1  h)  c
>
1
2
(1  h+ h) + 1
2
(1  h  h)
or
2h  1 +  (1  h) > c
which implies that for a range  (1  h)  c < 2h  1 +  (1  h) there is no
pure strategy equilibrium in which both either invest or do not investment.
We then have three equilibria; two asymmetric equilibria in which only one
candidate invests and the other candidate does not invest. In these equilibria
competence is high for all c < 2h  1 +  (1  h). Note that
2h  1 +  (1  h) > (2h  1) (1  )
which implies that insulation always leads to a more competent bureaucracy
in these two equilibria.
In addition, insulation always has a symmetric equilibrium in which both
candidates t = A;B invest into competence with probability
Pr(et = h) =
8<:
1 if c <  (1  h)
1  c (1 h)
2h 1 if  (1  h)  c < 2h  1 +  (1  h)
0 if 2h  1 +  (1  h)  c
:
29
To compare the two institutions in terms of welfare it is su¢ cient to
analyze the expected level of competence by the chosen bureaucrat. Expected
competence under patronage is
E [e] =
8<:
h if (1  p) (2h  1) (1  ) > c
ph+ (1  p) (1  h) if p (2h  1) (1  ) > c  (1  p) (2h  1) (1  )
1  h if c  p (2h  1) (1  )
and under insulation
E [e] =
8>><>>:
h if  (1  h) > c
1  h+ (2h  1)

1 

c (1 h)
2h 1
2
if 2h  1 +  (1  h) > c   (1  h)
1  h if c  2h  1 +  (1  h)
which implies that there is no unique value of p below which insulation is
adopted. We show this in the following section.
In order to illustrate the role of political competition we focus on two
cases p = 1 and p = 1
2
. For p = 1 there can be a range of costs for which
patronage leads to higher competence. This is the case if there are costs for
which candidate A invests under patronage while insulation does not lead to
full investment (in the mixed strategy equilibrium). This is the case if
(2h  1) (1  ) >  (1  h)
or
2h  1  h > 0:
It remains to be shown that patronage never leads to higher competence
for p close to 1
2
. Patronage leads to more competence if
1
2
(2h  1) (1  ) >  (1  h)
or
 < 2h  1
which is impossible by assumption   2h  1.
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D Institutional Choice with Investment Costs
As before focus on
  2h  1
which implies that the expected utility of the incumbent from adopting pa-
tronage is
EUA (S = patr; p; )
=
8<:
p (1  h+ h) + (1  p) (1  h  h) if p (2h  1) (1  ) < c
p (h+  (1  h)) + (1  p) (1  h  h) if p (2h  1) (1  )  c > (1  p) (2h  1) (1  )
p (h+  (1  h)) + (1  p) (h   (1  h)) if (1  p) (2h  1) (1  )  c
and the expected utility from political insulation in the mixed strategy equi-
librium is
EUA (S = insu; )
=
8>><>>:
h if c <  (1  h)
1  h+ (2h  1)

1 

c (1 h)
2h 1
2
if  (1  h)  c < 2h  1 +  (1  h)
1  h if 2h  1 +  (1  h)  c
which implies that due to discrete jumps in the utility, institutional choice
is ambiguous. We illustrate this in Figures A1 and A2 in which we draw
the two expected utility functions for h = 0:7 and  = 0:5 and the full
range of p 2 1
2
; 1

on the y-axis and costs c on the x-axis. In Figure A1 we
rst draw EUA (S = patr; p; ). Under patronage we have two conditions for
investment. The type A candidate stops to invest at
p (2h  1) (1  ) = c
and for the type B candidate stops to invest at
(1  p) (2h  1) (1  ) = c
which are clearly visible as two triangular shapes in the space spanned by c
and p in Figure A1. For very low values of c and p both candidates invest.
In Figure A2 we add the expected utility from insulation (under the as-
sumption of a mixed strategy equilibrium). The dark, smooth curved shape
31
represents EUA (S = insu; ) while the lighter plane with jumps still repre-
sents EUA (S = patr; p; ). As in the main model EUA (S = patr; p; ) is in-
creasing in p while EUA (S = insu; ) is not. The incumbent therefore tends
to adopt patronage with higher values of p. With very low and very high
costs both systems provide the same level of competence and the incumbent
is indi¤erent at p = 1
2
but prefers patronage otherwise.
Note that the choice of bureaucratic institution is now not necessarily
monotone in p. As illustrated in Figure A2 there are values of c (around
c = 0:1) for which the incumbent prefers patronage, prefers insulation with
rising p and patronage again for values of p close to 1. This is because
competence under patronage can fall in p as the candidate B stops to invest.
However, the main comparative statics remain quite simple. At very low
costs the incumbent prefers patronage as it comes at no cost in terms of
competence. When costs increase, patronage leads to incompetence and in-
sulation is preferred. When insulation also leads to incompetent bureaucrats
because of prohibitive costs, patronage is preferred again. Note that these
results are very much in line with the main model. As before, the incumbent
adopts insulation for low values of p and only if insulation o¤ers an advantage
in terms of competence. He never adopts insulation for high values of  .
E Proof of Proposition 4
Assume A1 (  1). As before recruitment under patronage is biased and
patronage creates incompetent bureaucrats. The incentives to invest in com-
petence remain high under insulation. Also, the likelihood that the incum-
bent is re-elected is 1
2
under insulation. Insulation is then introduced by the
incumbent if
1
2
(h+  (1  h)) + 1
2
(h   (1  h))


1
2
+
 (2  1)
2

(1  h+ h)
+

1 

1
2
+
 (2  1)
2

(1  h  h)
or
2h  1   (2  1) h
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which implies that insulation is introduced for ! 0 or ! 1
2
.
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Table 1: Political Competition and Political Independance of the Central Bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Independence of 
Central Bank CEO 
(2003)
Independence of 
Central Bank CEO 
(2003)
Independence of 
Central Bank CEO 
(1980-1989)
Independence of 
Central Bank CEO 
(2003)
Change in CEO 
Independance
political competition 
(1998-2003) 0.0600** 0.0832**
(0.0280) (0.0335)
GDP per capita (2002) -1.09e-06
(2.00e-06)
average inflation -6.48e-05
(0.000209)
political competition 
(1975-1985) 0.0537** 0.00298
(0.0257) (0.0227)
change in political 
competition 0.0900**
(0.0381)
difference in GDP pc -0.0318
(0.0438)
Observations 82 71 64 81 55
R-squared 0.054 0.085 0.066 0.000 0.107
Standard OLS Errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: Independance of Central Bank CEO and inflation data is from Crowe and Meade (2008). 
Political competition is from the PolityIV dataset. GDP per capita is from the IMF website. Political competition is the average score of "competitiveness of executive 
recruitment" which measures whether the chief executive is elected or selected. GDP per capita is GDP per capita, 2002 and 1980, in Billion US Dollars. Average inflation 
is the average inflation in percentage points between 1990 and 2000. For a detailed description of CEO Independance see Cukierman et al (1992).
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Figure 1: Competence with Investment Costs (No Political Competition)
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Figure 2: Competence with Investment Costs (Strong Political Competition)
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Figure A1: Incumbent Utility from Patronage with Investment Costs
both candidates invest
in competence
only candidate A invests
in competence
no candidate invests
in competence
Figure A2: Adoption of Insulation with Investment Costs
patronage is adoptedinsulation is adopted
Note: In the case of insulation we assume a mixed strategy equilibrium.
